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We augment the Stokey (1998) model by allowing agents to differ with respect to 
environmental quality and income in order to analyze the impact of income and 
environmental inequality, and of democratization on aggregate pollution. We find 
that the impact of a more equal income distribution depends on the degree of 
democracy. In a complete democracy a more equal income distribution generates, 
ceteris paribus, less pollution, which is consistent with indirect empirical evidence, 
whereas the opposite is the case if democratic rights are highly restricted. Further-
more, a democratization is argued to typically lower both the income and the 
environmental quality of the median voter. In this case, if, in utility terms, the fall in 
environmental quality is worse than the fall in consumption the median voter 
decides to tighten environmental legislation so that aggregate pollution decreases. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
A number of empirical studies on the relationship between pollution and 
economic growth have been conducted in the past ten years (e.g. Grossman 
and Krueger, 1993, 1995; Hettige et al., 1992; Holtz-Eakin and Selden, 
1995; and Selden and Song, 1994). These studies report an inverse U-
shaped relation between pollution and the level of economic development 
for some pollutants. The more local (in space and time) the effects of 
different pollutants are, the more likely it appears that this inverse U-
shaped pollution-income pattern applies
1. Because of its similarity to the 
pattern of income inequality documented by Kuznets (1955), an inverse U-
shaped pollution-income pattern is often called an Environmental Kuznets 
Curve (EKC). However, it should be emphasized that these empirical 
findings are debated (e.g. Ekins, 1997; Harbaugh et al., 2000), and that 
there are warnings against exaggerated optimism based on them (Arrow et 
al., 1995).  
As the empirical evidence typically relies on reduced-form regressions of 
environmental quality on income per capita and other explanatory 
variables, they do not shed light on the causes of the inverse U-shaped 
pollution-income pattern. As a result, a number of explanations have been 
put forward. One explanation is that the pattern arises because different 
sectors have different pollution intensities. During the course of develop-
ment there is a movement from clean agrarian economy to dirty manu-
facturing economy to clean service economy (Arrow et al., 1995). Other 
explanations rely on corner solutions. For example, Stokey (1998) develops 
a model where the social planner chooses the pollution intensity of the 
production technology. At incomes below a critical level there are no 
pollution controls and the most polluting technology is therefore used. As a 
result, total pollution increases with production. Above the critical level, 
emission standards become tougher and total pollution declines (given that 
the marginal benefit of higher consumption decreases rapidly). Also John 
and Pecchenino (1994) rely on a corner solution (in the context of an 
overlapping generation model) to produce an inverse U-shaped pollution-
income pattern. The critical assumption of Andreoni and Levinson (2001), 
on the other hand, is that the pollution abatement technology exhibits 
                                                            
1 Two possible reasons for this is that it is difficult to reach international agreements on 
emissions reductions and that it is impossible to reach agreements with future 
generations. For recent analyzes of these issues, see Kaitala et al. (1995), von Amsberg 
(1995), and Perman et al. (1999, Ch. 13).  
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increasing returns to scale. Other papers in the strand of literature that 
provides possible explanations for the inverted U-shaped pollution-income 
pattern include Ansuategi and Perrings (2000), Jones and Manuelli (2001), 
and Lopez (1994). (A survey is given by Vogel, 1999.) 
This paper adds a new element to the theoretical literature on the EKC. 
We introduce agent heterogeneity in both environmental quality and 
income
2. By allowing for heterogeneous agents, it is possible to study the 
impact of income and environmental inequality as well as the degree of 
democracy on aggregate environmental quality
3. Empirical evidence 
suggests that these factors are relevant. For example, Harbaugh et al. 
(2000) find that countries that are more democratic tend to pollute less (in 
terms of SO2) than countries that are less democratic, when holding the 
level of income per capita (and other controls) constant. In an earlier study, 
Grossman and Krueger (1993, tables 2-4) find that communist countries 
tend to pollute more than non-communist countries, when holding income 
per capita and other explana-tory variables constant. In addition, the World 
Development Report (1992, pp.1-2) strongly supports the hypothesis that 
inequality in environmental quality across individuals within countries is 
present and moreover that environmental quality tends to be correlated with 
income. It states that “it is often the poorest who suffer most from the 
consequences of pollution and environmental degradation” and that “sound 
environmental policies are thus likely to be powerfully redistributive”. 
In this paper we analyze the impact on aggregate pollution of changes in 
income and environmental inequality and in the degree of democracy when 
the average level of productivity per voter is held constant. Thus, the focus 
is here on exogenous changes in inequality and in the degree of democracy; 
that is, on changes that are not linked to the level of development. The aim 
is not to explain why an EKC might arise but rather to provide insights on 
why some countries pollute more than others, when holding the level of 
economic development constant. 
                                                            
2 Also Marsiliani and Renström (2000) allow agents to differ with respect to income. In 
contrast to our model, they do, however, not allow environmental quality to differ 
across individuals. 
3 In contrast, by using the representative agent framework the issue of aggregating 
divergent views is avoided. Stokey (1998, p. 22), e.g., states that “the optimal regulation 
problems analyzed here can be interpreted, roughly, as positive models of democratic 
societies in which income is not too unequally distributed”. As many of the countries in 
the samples for which environmental Kuznets curves have been estimated are neither 
democratic nor can at best be characterized by an equal income distribution, a 
motivation for our study is provided.  
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Our analysis is based on the static representative agent model of Stokey 
(1998, section 2), which we augment by allowing for heterogeneity in 
income and environmental quality across individuals. We assume that 
pollution controls are determined by the median voter. The model economy 
is closed and it is the flow of pollution that affects utility. Some types of 
pollution dissipate very rapidly (e.g., sulfur dioxide, particulates in the air, 
and some types of water pollution), so high levels of pollution can be 
reduced quickly once actions have been taken to do so. In these cases it is 
reasonable to assume that the disutility of pollution is related to the flow of 
new pollutants and it is thus adequate to use a static model. 
What are then the predictions of our model? To be consistent with 
income distributions of the real world, we assume that the productivity of 
the median citizen is lower than the average productivity. Under this 
assumption a mean-preserving change of the productivity distribution that 
implies a more equal distribution, increases the income of the median voter 
in a complete democracy and lowers the income of the median voter if 
democracy is highly restricted. As both consumption and environmental 
quality are assumed to be normal goods, a higher (lower) income of the 
median voter is used to improve (worsen) aggregate environmental quality 
by tightening (loosening) the environmental legislation. The theoretical 
result that there is a positive partial relation between the level of income 
inequality and aggregate pollution in a complete democracy may (at least in 
part) explain the puzzling observation of e.g. Grossman and Krueger 
(1995) that there is (for some pollutants) a third phase of the pollution-
income pattern in which pollution is increasing in income per capita. This 
is because this third phase appears to be solely due to the presence of the 
US in the sample, which also, among the rich countries, is very unequal 
with respect to the distribution of income. Recall that Grossman and 
Krueger (1995) do not control for the level of income inequality in their 
regressions. 
Whether less inequality in environmental quality across individuals 
implies less or more aggregate pollution depends again on how the median 
voter is affected, which in turn depends both on the degree of democracy 
and on the shape of the distribution for environmental quality, which we, in 
contrast to the income distribution, know little about. If the distribution is 
symmetric, less environmental inequality has no effect on aggregate pollu-
tion in a complete democracy, whereas it decreases if democracy is less 
than complete. 
The prediction of the model regarding the impact on aggregate pollution 
of increased democracy is ambiguous. We typically assume that an  
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expanded franchise lower both the income and the environmental quality of 
the median voter. If, in utility terms, the fall in environmental quality is 
worse than the fall in consumption he votes for stricter environmental 
legislation to the extent that aggregate pollution decreases, which then is 
consistent with the empirical results of Harbaugh et al. (2000). However, 
this empirical study is not a test of our model as other variables such as 
measures of income inequality are not accounted for, which empirically 
tend to be correlated with democracy indices.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 the components of the model 
are described: preferences, technology, and the assumptions regarding 
income and environmental inequality. Section 3 analyzes the median 
voter’s optimal choice of environmental legislation. Section 4 and 5 ana-
lyze the impact on aggregate pollution of exogenous changes in inequality 





2.   The model 
 
We assume that the economy consists of many individuals. Each individual 
is assumed to be endowed with one unit of inelastically supplied labor and 
his production is assumed to equal his consumption. The individuals enjoy 
different levels of consumption, because of different levels of productivity. 
The consumption level of individual i depends on the technology used, z, 
and his potential output,  i y : 
 
  z y c i i =      (1) 
 
[0,1] z∈  is an index of the technology used and it is the same for each 
individual. A higher z means a larger output, but also more pollution. When 
z = 1, the most polluting technology is used and potential output is 
obtained. Thus, z is an index of the emission rate of the production process. 
The decision-making problem of this model is to choose the optimal level 
of z, which we assume is determined by the median voter. 
The potential production of individual i is 
 
  () i af yi =    () 0 > ′ i f  ,      ''( ) 0 fi >    (2) 
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The individuals are uniformly distributed on the unit interval (i.e.  [0,1] i∈ ) 
and an individual with a higher i has a higher productivity. The produc-
tivity function f is illustrated in Figure 1. f is assumed to be a convex 
function which means that the productivity of the median citizen is lower 
than the average productivity. This assumption is thus consistent with the 
empirical fact that the median income in a society typically is lower than 
the mean income. a is a technology parameter measuring the average level 
of productivity. We assume that a grows exogenously over time.  
This paper analyzes, inter alia, what the possible effects of increased 
democratization are on the policy choice, i.e. the choice of z. We model this 
by assuming that any government (both so-called democracies and non-
democracies) responds to the wishes of the median voter who thereby 
determines the policy outcome. However, in non-democracies only a 
particular subset of the population has the right to vote. This subset, which 
is assumed to be exogeneously given, may typically be a privileged group, 
both in terms of environmental quality and income, since this group may 
have the means to live further away from the emission sources
4.  
In Figure 1 the franchise is found between  L i  and 1. The median voter is 
found in the middle: at  () 1/ 2 L mi =+ . An extended franchise means that  L i  
falls, which then means that the identity of the median voter changes; i.e., 
m falls. Thus, in our model an extended franchise means that poorer groups 
get the right to vote. This assumption is consistent with the historical 
experience of many countries. (See e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 
who also provide a theory of why political reforms of this kind come about: 
they are strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent social unrest and 
revolution.) If  L i  = 0 the economy is a complete democracy and the median 
citizen (i = ½) is also the median voter. 
Pollution from individual i is assumed to be an increasing function of 
production and the technology index: 
1 − ⋅
β z z yi , where  1 > β . To get 
aggregate pollution, we sum over all individuals: 
 
  ()





     (3) 
 
                                                            
4 We assume that the geographical distribution of the population is exogenously given. 
See Vogel (1999, p. 103ff) for a discussion on how middle income households may be 
more in favor of a strict environmental legislation than the very rich as the latter can 
afford to move to a good local environment.  
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The integral F is thus normalized to unity. Equation (3) shows that at a 
given level of pollution controls, pollution increases with average 
productivity. It also shows that if cleaner technologies are adopted (z falls) 
a decline in aggregate pollution may coexist with growth in productivity. 
Our assumption that there is heterogeneity with respect to perceived 
environmental quality among the population is captured by a function that 
describes the pollution level perceived by individual i: 
 
  () i xg xi =    () 0 < ′ i g ,   ''( ) 0 gi=  (4) 
 
Thus, the citizens are uniformly ordered (on the unit interval) so that a 
consumer/producer with a higher i is less affected by aggregate pollution 
than a consumer with a lower i. This is shown in Figure 2. In contrast to the 
income distribution, we lack empirical data to guide us on the curvature of 
g; in Figure 2 we depict a middle ground, the linear case. In the subsequent 
analysis we assume that the order of individuals with respect to income is 
identical to the order of individuals with respect to environmental quality, 
or, at least, we assume that individuals excluded from voting are dis-
advantaged in terms of income or in terms of environmental quality. The 
assumption that the order of individuals with respect to income is identical 
to the order of individuals with respect to environmental quality then means 
that a consumer with a higher i (relative to a consumer with a lower i) both 
has a higher environmental quality and a higher productivity, and that the 
median voter in Figures 1 and 2 is the same person. The assumption that 
the orderings of individuals are identical in both dimensions is unlikely to 
be true, but income and perceived environmental quality may be positively 
correlated across individuals in many economies. This is argued by e.g. the 
World Development Report (1992, pp.1-2). Finally, note that the model is 
identical to the Stokey (1998) model, if  () () i i g i f ∀ = = , 1 . 
We assume that the individuals have identical preferences that, for 
individual i, are represented by the utility function 
 
















x c U      (5) 
 
Based on empirical evidence (e.g. Hall, 1988; Hahm, 1998) we typically, 
in the subsequent analysis, impose the more restrictive assumption that 
1 > σ , which adds more structure to the model. 
To help the understanding of the optimal choice (described in the next 
section), note that, close to the origin, the marginal utility of consumption  
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( )
σ −
i c  is very large, while the marginal disutility of pollution ( )
1 − −
γ
i x  is small 
(in absolute terms). In such a situation, more consumption is valued more 
than a cleaner environment. As growth in a makes consumption and 
pollution increase, the absolute levels of marginal utilities converge. As a 





3.   The equilibrium 
 
Since we assume that the economy consists of many individuals, each of 
them neglects his own contribution to aggregate pollution. The emission 
externalities are, in part, internalized by voting on z. Thus, voters affect 
their own environmental quality by voting on the value of z, and thereby 
the aggregate level of pollution is determined. The choice of the median 
voter is decisive for the magnitude of z. We assume that voting on z takes 
place at every point in time.  
Since we apply the median voter theorem, we abstract from features of 
the political process that might be important for policy outcomes. Such 
features would include the electoral and legislative process, bureaucratic 
behavior as well as special interest group activity. Despite this simplify-
cation, the median voter theorem is widely applied (in this ”Downsian” 
manner) to so-called general interest issues (as opposed to special interest 
issues; see Persson, 1998). 
A political equilibrium exists, because we deal with a single issue and 
single-peaked preferences. The median voter decides on the level of 
pollution controls, throughout the economy, by maximizing 
 
  () () () () ()
γ σ









     (6) 
 
with respect to z. The first order condition for a maximum is 
 
() ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) () () 0 * * * *
1 1 ≥ − = ′
− − − z m g z a z m af z U
γ β σ σ β      w.e.w.  1 *< z  (7) 
 
The optimal value of z, defined by (7), may change over time due to 
growth in the level of productivity, a. By the assumptions about the 
functions of the model, a corner solution, z* = 1, is optimal at low levels of  
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development. When the level of productivity reaches a critical level, it is 
optimal to start tightening environmental standards; that is, z* < 1. To see 
this, we note that  ()0 * < ′′ z U  and compute the derivative 
 
() () () ( ) ()( ) () ()
1 1 * * *









z U γ β σ σ β
γ σ  (8) 
 
Assuming  1 > σ , this expression is negative. The economy starts with a 
phase one when a is low, z* = 1 and  () '1 0 U > . As productivity increases 
() '1 U  decreases and eventually reaches a point where  () 0 1 = ′ U . When 
productivity increases further, a second phase starts during which z* < 1 
and decreasing. The economic interpretation of this pattern is as follows: at 
low levels of development, when the level of production is low, additional 
consumption is  valued highly. At the same time, the low level of produc-
tion does not harm the environment much. When a has increased 
sufficiently, production satisfies more than basic consumption needs. At 
this stage it is optimal to vote for a tighter environmental legislation, which 
implies less than potential production and a better aggregate environmental 
quality. 
To obtain more details about this pattern, we first compute the critical 
productivity level,  S a , where we have the switch between phases. We set z* 
= 1 in equation (7) with equality and solve: 
 
  () () () ()
1
1 1
S ag m f m
γσ σ γ β
− −−  =
      (9) 
 
During phase one z* = 1,  () i af ci = *  and x* = a. Thus, consumption and 
aggregate pollution grow at a common rate during this first stage of 
development.  
During phase two,  S a a >  so equation (7) holds with equality and we 
have an interior solution for the optimal level of technology: 
 
  () () () ()
1
1 1 1 *1 zg m a f m
γσ σβ γ γσ β
− −− +−  =<
    (10) 
 
By the assumptions about the parameters, z* clearly decreases as a 
grows. To see what happens to consumption and pollution, we substitute 
(10) into (1) and (3): 
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  () ( ) () ()() () [] βγ σ σ β γ γ β − − − − = 1
1
1 1 * m f a m g i f ci   (11) 
 
  () () () ()() ()
() [] βγ σ σ β σ β βγ β β − − − − − = 1
1
1 1 1 * m f a m g x    (12) 
 
Since  1 > β , consumption is increasing in a. A necessary and sufficient 
condition for pollution to decrease during phase 2 is that  1 > σ . To interpret 
this, recall that the higher value of σ , the more “concave” is the utility 
function with respect to consumption. In particular, when  1 > σ , utility of 
consumption approaches the maximum level  ) 1 /( 1 − σ  asymptotically as 
consumption grows. In other words, there is a tendency to satiation in 
consumption. In this case, z* is lowered to the extent that the level of 
aggregate pollution in fact decreases. Since income is equal to consumption 
in this model, the development described here thus produces an EKC; an 
inverse U-shaped (or more correctly an inverse V-shaped) pollution-
income pattern. Thus, at given levels of  () m f  and  () m g  our model exhibits 





4.   The effect of inequality on pollution 
 
In this section we analyze the impact on aggregate pollution of changes in 
inequality when average level of productivity is held constant. Thus, the 
focus is here on exogenous changes in inequality; that is, on changes in 
inequality that are not linked to the level of development. What we study is 
the effect of changes in the functions  () m f  and  () m g  when the median 
voter, m, is unaltered. 
We first note, from equations (9) and (12), that a higher value of  () m f  
implies lower values of  S a  and x* (given that  1 > σ ). Thus, if the median 
voter in terms of potential output becomes richer he wants to increase both 
consumption and environmental quality as both these goods are normal 
goods. Consequently, his voting implies that phase two starts earlier, and 
that aggregate pollution is lower (at given values of a) during the second 
phase. 
To address the question whether a more equal income distribution leads 
to less aggregate pollution, consider one relatively unequal distribution,  
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() i f
1 , and one relatively equal distribution,  () i f
2 , in Figure 3. We assume 
that both distributions satisfy the assumption that F = 1, i.e. a change in the 
distribution does not change the average level of productivity
5. In a 
complete democracy a mean-preserving change toward a more equal 
income distribution,  () i f
2 , implies that the productivity of the median 
citizen increases; that is,  () () 2 / 1 2 / 1
1 2 f f > . As both consumption and en-
vironmental quality are normal goods, the median voter then favors stricter 
pollution controls to also improve aggregate environmental quality. In 
other words, holding the average level of productivity or income per voting 
worker constant, the partial relation between the level of income inequality 
and aggregate pollution is positive in a complete democracy. This 
theoretical result may explain why Grossman and Krueger (1995, Figure 
1), puzzling enough, find a third phase of the empirical pollution-income 
pattern (e.g., for sulphur dioxide in cities) in which pollution is increasing 
in income
6. This third phase appears to be solely due to the presence of the 
US in the sample
7, which also, among the rich countries, is very unequal 
with respect to the distribution of income (see e.g. Dollar and Kray, 2001; 
Deininger and Squire, 1996). Thus, our theoretical result that a rise in 
income inequality, ceteris paribus, increases aggregate pollution indicates 
that Grossman and Krueger’s (1995) third phase may (at least in part) be 
due to an omitted variable, the degree of income inequality, which they do 
not account for. 
If, on the other hand, democracy is highly restricted, say between  L i  and 
1 in Figure 3, a more equal productivity distribution means that the 
productivity of the median voter falls:  () () m f m f
1 2 <
8. To regain some 
consumption, he votes for looser environmental regulation and aggregate 
pollution therefore increases. In other words, holding the average level of 
productivity or income per voting worker constant, the partial relation 
                                                            
5 As both distributions are convex, they both imply that the productivity of the median 
citizen,  () 2 / 1
j f  (j = 1,2), is lower than the average level of productivity. 
6 Grossman and Krueger (1995) find that the empirical pollution-income pattern for 
some pollutants is best described by a third-degree polynomial; that is, at first pollution 
increases with income, then it decreases, and, finally, pollution increases again. 
7 This is because the third phase occurs at a level of income per capita (in 1985 prices) 
of around 17000 US Dollars, and the US is the only country in the sample with a level 
of income per capita this high. 
8 Note that if the degree of democracy is only somewhat restricted we get the same 
qualitative effect on aggregate pollution of a more equal productivity distribution that 
we get in the case of a complete democracy.   
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between income inequality and aggregate pollution is negative in a society 
in which voting rights are highly restricted. 
The effect on aggregate pollution of a change in the distribution for 
environmental quality across individuals depends on the curvature of g(m) 
as well as on the degree of democracy. If the function g is linear (which we 
have assumed), there is no difference between the median and mean 
environmental quality in a complete democracy. As a mean-preserving 
change of a symmetric distribution does not change the environmental 
quality of the median voter, the aggregate level of pollution is unaffected 
by changes in the distribution for environmental quality in a complete 
democracy. If, on the other hand, democracy is restricted, there is a 
difference between the average environmental quality and that of the 
median voter. An equalization of environmental quality then means that the 
median voter is more affected by a givel level of aggregate pollution. In 
Figure 4 we move from  
1 g  to 
2 g  and  () ()
21 gm gm > . As a consequence the 





5.  The effect of democratization on pollu-
tion 
 
In this section we investigate under what assumptions more democracy 
means less aggregate pollution, holding everything else (including the 
average level of productivity) constant. We study the impact of changes in 
() m f  and  () m g  that are due to changes in m. Democratization means that m 
declines (see Figures 1-4). The impact of democratization is studied by 
computing the logarithmic partial derivatives of equations (9) – (12) with 
respect to m. (We denote a proportional change by a circumflex.): 
 
  ()
1 ˆ ˆˆ 1
1
S af g σ γ
σγ
 =− +  −−
   (13) 
 
                                                            
9 We get the same effect if g is a convex function regardless of whether democracy is 
restricted or not. In the case g is a concave function, we may get the same qualitative 
effect when democracy is restricted, but we get the opposite qualitative effect if the 
economy is a complete democracy.  
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  ()
1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ*** 1
1
i zc x f g σ γ
σβ γ
 == = −+  −−
      (14)-(16) 
  
Note that the expressions outside the brackets on the right hand side of 
the equations are negative. In this section we consider one case in which 
there is no income inequality (i.e.,  '( ) 0 fm = ) and one case in which there is 
no inequality in environmental quality (i.e.,  '( ) 0 gm= ). Thus, in this section 
() ()0 / ˆ ≥ ′ ≡ m f m f f  and  () ()0 / ˆ ≤ ′ ≡ m g m g g . Furthermore, we here maintain 
the assumption that  1 > σ . 
We consider four different cases when analyzing the impact on 
aggregate pollution of increased democratization. In the first two cases we 
assume that only one heterogeneity - income inequality or inequality in 
environmental quality - exists at a time. In these two cases we do not rely 
on the assumption that the order of the individuals with respect productivity 
is identical to the order of individuals with respect to perceived 
environmental quality. However, we do assume that more democracy 
means that disadvantaged groups in terms of income or in terms of 
environmental quality get the right to vote. Case I: We assume that the 
citizens of the economy are equal with respect to how they perceive a 
certain aggregate level of pollution but differ in productivity: that is,  0 ˆ > f  
and  0 ˆ = g . A democratization reform means that the level of consumption 
of the new median voter is lower relative to the level of consumption of the 
median voter prior to the reform, whereas the level of environmental 
quality is unchanged. To compensate for the fall in consumption, the new 
median voter therefore favors a less tight environmental legislation, i.e. he 
votes for a higher z*, and aggregate pollution increases. Thus, in an 
economy where  0 ˆ > f  and  0 ˆ = g  we find that the partial relation between 
the degree of democracy and aggregate pollution is positive. (We also 
conclude that more democracy in this economy means a higher  S a .) 
Case II: If  0 ˆ = f  and  0 ˆ < g , more democracy means less aggregate 
pollution. In this case, the median voter after a democratic reform is more 
affected by a given level of aggregate pollution relative to the median voter 
prior to the reform whereas the level of consumption is unchanged. The 
new median voter therefore favors a lower z* at the cost of a lower level of 
consumption. (We also conclude that a democratic reform in this economy 
lowers  S a , and, as a result, this economy enters phase 2 earlier.) 
In the last two cases we rely on the assumption that the order of 
consumers with respect to productivity is identical to the order of 
consumers with respect to perceived environmental quality. The results  
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from these two cases can be summarized as follows: More democracy is 
assumed to lower both the income and the environmental quality of the 
median voter. If, in utility terms, the fall in environmental quality is worse 
than the fall in consumption, he votes for stricter environmental legislation 
and aggregate pollution decreases. Case III: We assume that the rates of 
change with respect to m of the distribution functions are equal but with 
opposite signs; that is,  ˆ ˆ gf =− . Under this assumption more democracy 
means less pollution if  1 γ σ >−. To see this, we rewrite the first order 
condition of equation (7) with equality: 
 
  () ( ) ( )() ()( ) () () 0 * * * *
1 1 = − = ′
− − − z m g z a z m af z U
γ β σ σ β    (7’) 
 
If a change in m causes f and g to change in about equal proportions, but 
in opposite directions, the change of the expression for  () Uz ′  depends 
primarily on the exponents above f and g. Given that  1 γ σ >−, the loss of 
utility from a fall in consumption is lower than the increased disutility from 
pollution (U′  decreases). Consequently, the new median voter counteracts 
this by lowering z*. 
Case IV: We assume that  1 − =σ γ . In this case, aggregate pollution 
decreases as a result of an expanded franchise if and only if  ˆ ˆ gf −> , which 
occurs if environmental quality is more unequally distributed than 
productivity is around m. More democracy then means that the 
environmental quality of the median voter decreases to a larger extent than 
his level of consumption does. Since both consumption and environmental 
quality are valued equally much at the margin (i.e.,  1 − =σ γ ), the new 
median voter compensates the larger fall in environmental quality by 
lowering z* which decreases aggregate pollution. 
Do the predictions of the model correspond the results of the previous 
empirical literature? E.g. Harbaugh et al. (2000) find that the degree of 
democracy, holding everything else including the level of income per 
capita constant, is negatively correlated with pollution of SO2. In cases II-
IV of our model more democracy generates indeed less pollution. How-
ever, in case I more democracy means more pollution. In short, the 
predictions of our model on democracy and pollution are not unambiguous. 
Can we say that Harbaugh et al.’s (2000) empirical study points out what 
cases (of cases I-IV) we should believe in? No, we cannot. Partly because 
Harbaugh et al. do not include other variables, which our model says are 
relevant for the level of pollution. In particular, measures of income 
inequality are not included and such measures tend to be correlated with  
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democracy indices. Thus, from the perspective of our theoretical model we 
expect an omitted variable bias on the estimated coefficient of the 
democracy index in Harbaugh et al’s study. To test the model both 
measures of income inequality and of the level of democracy should be 




6.   Discussion and conclusions 
 
This paper contributes to the theoretical literature on the relation between 
pollution and the level of income per capita. More specifically, we study 
the impact of exogenous changes in income and environmental inequality 
as well as in the degree of democracy when the level of income per capita 
is held constant. A motivation for the paper is provided by the stylized fact 
that countries (in the samples for which EKC have been estimated) to a 
considerable degree vary with respect to income inequality and with 
respect to the degree of democracy. E.g., Harbaugh et al. (2000) find that 
countries that are more democratic, ceteris paribus, tend to pollute less (in 
terms of SO2) than countries that are less democratic. 
The theoretical framework for the analysis is the static representative 
agent model of Stokey (1998) which we extend by allowing for 
heterogeneity in income and environmental quality across individuals. We 
find that the impact on aggregate pollution of a more equal income 
distribution depends on the degree of democracy. In a complete democracy 
a more equal income distribution generates, ceteris paribus, less pollution, 
whereas the opposite is the case if democracy is highly restricted. The 
impact of less inequality in environmental quality across individuals 
depends both on the degree of democracy and on the shape of the 
distribution for environmental quality, which we, in contrast to the income 
distribution, know little about. In the case of a symmetric distribution, we 
find that less environmental inequality has no effect on aggregate pollution 
in a complete democracy, whereas it lowers aggregate pollution if voting 
rights are restricted. 
An expanded franchise typically means that lower income groups get the 
right to vote. Moreover, lower income groups may also be the ones most 
subject to a given level of aggregate pollution. This is e.g. argued by the 
World Development Report (1992). As a result, we typically assume that 
an expansion of the franchise lower both the income and the environmental  
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quality of the median voter. The prediction of the model regarding the 
impact of an expanded franchise under this assumption is ambiguous. If, in 
utility terms, the fall in environmental quality is worse than the fall in 
consumption the median voter votes to tighten emission rates so that that 
aggregate pollution decreases.    
One prediction of the model is consistent with indirect empirical 
evidence. The theoretical result that there is a positive partial relation 
between the level of income inequality and aggregate pollution in a 
complete democracy may (at least in part) explain the puzzling observation 
of e.g. Grossman and Krueger (1995) that there is (for some pollutants) a 
third phase of the pollution-income pattern in which pollution is increasing 
in income per capita. This is because this third phase appears to be solely 
due to the presence of the US in the sample, which also, among the rich 
countries, is very unequal with respect to the distribution of income. Recall 
that Grossman and Krueger (1995) do not control for income inequality in 
their regressions. It would be desirable that future research more directly 
test both the link between income inequality and aggregate pollution well 
as the other predictions of the model. In order to do so both measures of 
income inequality and of democracy should be included as explanatory 
variables in EKC-regressions. Moreover, as the effect of a change in 
inequality typically depends on the degree of democracy, the empirical 
analysis should also include interaction terms between these two variables. 
(Note, however, that empirical work is restricted by the lack of measures of 
environmental inequality across individuals within countries.)  
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Figure 3.  A mean-preserving change of the 
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